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Civil Rights Act of 1964 
slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same 
right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property." The act then 
detailed the attributes of citizenship, stipulating that all 
Americans would enjoy the same "full and equal benefit 
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens," including being 
"subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to 
none other." 
The rest of the act dealt with penalties, jurisdiction, 
and enforcement. Section 2 stated that anybody who 
deprived a person of"any right secured or protected by this 
act" could be fined up to one thousand dollars, imprisoned 
for as long as one year, or both. Subsequent parts of the 
statute were intended to prevent local officials and others 
from using inaction, evasion, or intimidation to foil the law. 
Section 3 gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
cases brought under the act. Section 4 granted authority to 
a broad range of federal officials to bring charges against 
those who violated the act. Sections 5 and 6 imposed fines 
and imprisonment upon anyone convicted of obstructing 
enforcement of the act. Sections 8 and 9 empowered the 
president to direct judges, marshals, district attorneys, 
soldiers, sailors, and militiamen to prevent violations of the 
act and ensure its enforcement. 
In terms of law and governance, the primary 
significance of the Civil Rights Act was its use of federal 
authority to protect the rights of individuals. The act 
empowered federal officials to overrule state laws in order 
to guarantee equality, and in this it reflected the same 
radical Republican political commitments that had made 
possible the use of centralized authority to destroy slave1y. 
This expansion of federal power at the expense of the 
states departed from earlier traditions of American 
governance, but the circumstances of Reconstruction-
deflant southern whites attempting to render the freed-
peoples' liberty virtually meaningless only months after 
the defeat of their rebellion at the cost of more than six 
hundred thousand lives-led tnembers of Congress to see 
this approach as not just possible, but imperative. 
The act did have its limitations. Its benefits were not 
extended to Native Americans, most of whom would not 
gain citizenship until decades later. Moreover, it made no 
mention of a right to vote, because any such provision 
would have enfranchised black men, and most whites 
strongly opposed bla~k suffrage at that point. African 
Americans objected vigorously to being denied the ballot, 
but as the bill's authot explained, the Civil Rights Act as it 
stood was "as far as the country will go at the present 
time." (quoted in Foner 1988, p. 245). 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 was for many years quite limited because its basic 
stipulations were quickly constitutionalized as section one 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In circuit court rulings in 
1866 and 1867, Chief Justice Salmon Chase and Justice 
Noah Swayne (1804-1884) both found the law a legitimate 
exercise of Congress's power to preserve freedom under the 
Thirteenth Amendment. A century later, however, the 
Supreme Court revivified the law as a support for expansive 
action by Congress to protect Americans' civil rights 
because it seemed to allow federal authority to extend 
beyond what was considered permissible under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 
(1968), the Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act forbade 
racial discrimination by private citizens in the rental or sale 
of housing. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), 
the Court found that the act could prevent private schools 
from using race as a reason to reject qualified applicants. 
And in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Tramportation Co., 427 
U.S. 273 (1976); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 
U.S. 615 (1987); and Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 
481 U.S. 604 (1987), the Court decided that the act also 
protected white people, religious minorities, and ethnic 
groups, respectively. These latter rulings have since been 
subject to challenge, indicating the ongoing relevance of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to civil rights enforcement in the 
twenty-first century. 
SEE ALSO Amendments, Post-Civil War,· Fourteenth 
Amendment; Reconstruction; Thirteenth Amendment 
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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S. C.A.) (the 19 
Act) lilcely has had the greatest transformative effect 
American society of any single law. By prohibiti 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, a 
national origin in places of public accommodation, , 
federally assisted programS, in employment, in schoo 
and with respect to voting rights, this massive law has h 
profound effects on almost eve1y facet of Ameri 
society. 1~hough other civil rights acts and laws 
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Signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by President Lyndon B. Johnson, with Martin Luthet 
King. Jr., observing. Considered by many scholars to be the most wide-reaching law ever passed in 
the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 affected the lives of 1nillions of Americans, expressly 
prohibiting discrimination on race, gender, religion, and ethnic background. Unlike previous attempts at 
civil rights legislation, the constitutionality of the 1964 act held up under examination by the Supreme 
Court and received widespread, though not unanimous, acceptance from the American public. 
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vindicate civil rights have been passed, no other law was as 
well received by the Supreme Court as the 1964 Act and it 
is possible that no other civil rights law has been as 
generally accepted by the public as the 1964 Act. 
THE ACT'S PASSAGE 
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. The law's passage was 
the culmination of extended congressional and national 
debate regarding civil rights in general and the role of race 
in particular in society. l~he act had originally been sent to 
Congress by President John F. Kennedy on June 19, 
1963. President Johnson called for the passage of the civil 
rights bill as a legacy to President Kennedy on November 
27, 1963, in an address to Congress shortly after President 
I<ennedy's assassination. Eventually, President Johnson 
would use the power of the presidency and his personal 
influence derived from his years in Congress to help 
shepherd the bill into law. 
The 1964 Act was not met with universal support in 
Congress. Various parliamentary maneuvers were necessaiy 
to push the bill past Congressman Howard W. Smith 
(1883-1976) of Virginia, the powerful chairman of the 
House Rules Committee. Similar obstacles had to be 
surmounted in the Senate. Indeed, once on the floor of the 
. Senate, the act was subject to a filibuster that lasted eighry-
rwo days and stands as the longest in the Senate's history. 
During debate in both the House and the Senate, a number 
of congressmen and senators, most of whom were from the 
South, argued that the act was an unconstitutional affront 
to states' rights that exceeded Congress's power under the 
Constitution. Though the debate was heated, the final 
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version of the act ultimately passed 73 to 27 in the Senate 
and 289 to 126 in the House. 
The 1964 Act certainly was not the first act Congress 
ever passed to vindicate civil rights. Soon after the Civil War 
(1861-1865), Congress passed the Civil Rights Acts of 
1866 and 1875 in attempts to effectuate the liberty that 
many in Congress believed was granted by the abolition of 
slavery in the Thitteenth Amendment and the call for 
citizenship and equality in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3 (1883). Indeed, that decision struck down the public 
accommodations clauses that were retooled and reborn in 
the 1964 Act. In the several years before the 1964 Act was 
enacted, Congress passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 
1960. However, both were fairly mild measures focused 
largely on voting rights. Congress did not stop with the 1964 
Act. The 1964 Act has been amended a number of times, 
including significant amendments in 1972 and 1991. 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ACT 
The 1964, Act prohibits discrimination in certain 
substantive areas and creates mechanisms to monitor the 
advance of, and enforce the protection of, equal rights for 
all. The self-styled purpose of the 1964 Act was 
to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to 
confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the 
United States to provide injunctive relief against 
discrimination in public accommodations, to 
authorize the Attorney General to institute suits 
to protect constitutional rights in public facilities 
and public education, to extend the Commission 
on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in 
federally assisted prograins, to establish a Com-
mission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and 
for other purposes. 
The language of the 1964 Act speaks in terms of 
nondiscrimination. Though the Court has lapsed occa-
sionally into speaking of "protected groups" under the 
1964 Act, particularly with respect to Title VII of the act, 
the act itself merely requires equal treatment for all by 
limiting the bases on which persons can be treated 
differently. Guaranteeing that citizens of all races, and 
religions, for example, enjoy the same rights is consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment command of equal 
protection of the laws. However, as noted below, 
Congress' power to enact the 1964 Act provisions 
affecting private actors was found to be explicitly justified 
based on its commerce clause power, rather than on power 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Eleven Titles of the Act The 1964 Act has eleven 
titles, with some titles focusing on addressing 
discrimination in specific areas of American life, others 
creating agencies to enforce specific parts of the act, and 
yet others establishing procedures for enforcing the act. 
Title I has largely been superseded. Title I focused on 
procedural equality in voting rights. For example, rather 
than bar literacy tests, Title I limited the manner in which 
literacy tests could be given. Functionally, the voting 
rights provisions of the 1964 Act were superseded by the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its later amendments, 
which strengthened the procedural and substantive 
prohibitions on voting rights discrimination pursuant to 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Titles V, VIII, and X establish some of the agencies 
and procedures necessary to monitor the advance of equal 
rights. Title V provides procedures to follow, and 
redefines the role and duties of the Commission on Civil 
Rights that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 created. Title V 
requires that the commission investigate allegations of 
deprivations of the right to vote, evaluate legal develop-
ments and federal laws to make sure they do not 
constitute denials of the equal protection of the laws, 
and serve as a clearinghouse for information respecting 
violations of equal protection. Though the commission 
and its charge were altered somewhat and re-codified in 
1983, its basic function has remained the same. 
Title VIII requires that the secretary of commerce 
compile registration and voting statistics for use by the 
Commission on Civil Rights. Title X established the 
Community Relations Service as a part of the Department 
of Commerce to "provide assistance to communities and 
persons therein in resolving disputes, disagreements, or 
difficulties relating to discriminatory practices based on 
race, color, or national origin which impair the rights of 
persons in such communities under the Constitution or 
laws of the United States or which affect or may affect 
interstate commerce." 
Titles IX and XI are procedural and descriptive. Title 
IX specifies procedural processes in civil rights cases where 
plaintiffs seek relief from a denial of equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Title XI is a mass of 
miscellaneous provisions designed to increase the 1964 
Act's effectiveness and define its scope. 
~fhe 1964 Act's substantive core consists of Titles II, 
III, IV, VI, and VII. These titles prohibit discrimination 
in various substantive areas. Title II focuses on public 
accommodations. It bars discrimination and segregation 
based on race, color, religion, or national origin with 
respect to hotels, restaurants, theaters, stadiums, and like 
facilities, if their "operations affect commerce, or if 
discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State 
action." Under certain conditions, private clubs and 
nonpublic establishments are not covered by the title. 
Title II spawned the first Supreme Court cases that 
addressed the constitutionality of the 1964 Act: Heart of 
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Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Both cases 
were filed just afi:er the 1964 Act became law and were 
decided by the Supreme Court on an expedited basis. In 
Heart of Atlanta, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment 
dec1ning the 1964 Act unconstitutional. Plaintiff argued, 
inter alia, that the act exceeded Congress' power under the 
commerce clause of the Constitution. After noting that 
the Heart of Atlanta Motel had substantial connection to 
interstate travel and commerce, the Court indicated that 
its ruling would be limited to determining whether 
Congress had appropriate power under the commerce 
clause to render the act constitutional. The Court 
explicitly noted that it was not deciding whether 
Congress' enforcement power under section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was a sufficient basis to validate 
the act. In doing so, the Court sidestepped the issue of 
precisely how the invalidation of the public acconuuoda-
tions provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by The 
Civil Rights Cases would affect the Court's decision. 
Nonetheless, the Court stated that The Civil Rights Cases 
would not resolve the issue as to the 1964 Act's public 
accommodations provisions because they were narrower 
and different than the like provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875. The Court concluded that the 1964 Act's 
public accommodations provisions were clearly within 
Congress' commerce clause power when, as in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, they were applied to a motel that 
admittedly served interstate travelers. Though the Court 
expressed no opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment 
question, the concurrences by Justices William 0. 
Douglas and Arthur ]. Goldberg argued that the act was 
also constitutional pursuant to Congress' enforcement 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Katzenbach arguably was more difficult than Heart of 
Atlanta Motel because it involved a restaurant, Ollie's 
Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama, that catered to local 
residents and did not appear to serve or seek to serve 
interstate travelers. Ollie's Barbecue was subject to Title II 
of the 1964 Act because that title regulated restaurants if a 
substantial portion of the food the restaurant served 
traveled in interstate commerce. 1~hat much of the meat 
Ollie's Barbecue served was purchased from a local 
supplier, who bought it from an out-of-state supplier, 
suggested that the restaurant was subject to the act. The 
Coun determined, in limiting the act's coverage to 
restaurants that imported a substantial portion of the food 
they served from out-of-state, Congress acted within its 
Article I power to regulate interstate commerce. 
Titles II1 and IV authorize the government to provide 
assistance to gtiarantee that the constitutional commands 
to desegregate public facilities and public schools were 
enforced. Title III authorizes the attorney general to 
become involved in cases in which people were 
Civ;/ Rights Act of 1964 
demanding the desegregation of public fucilities if those 
people could not fully or adequately prosecute the case on 
their own. Title IV facilitates the continued desegregation 
of public education by requiring that the commissioner of 
education (now the secretaiy of education) su1vey and 
report on the equality of schools, and by allowing the 
commissioner to provide technical assistance regarding the 
desegregation of schools. In addition, as under Title Ill, 
Title N authorizes the attorney general to intervene in 
cases in which potential meritorious litigants cannot 
adequately prosecute a case involving the desegregation of 
public schools. Mucl1 of the litigation to which Title III or 
Title IV would apply is brought under the Constitution's 
equal protection clause without reference to the 1964 Act. 
For example, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), a school desegregation case, 
was considered an attempt to apply the strictures of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Title N was 
implicated because the case involved school desegregation. 
However, the Court indicated that Title IV' s purpose was 
to define how the federal government could facilitate the 
desegregation process, rather than to augment the 
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Consequently, the Court ruled that the requirements of 
Title N go only as far as the limits of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Of course, the federal government was to 
have a role to play up to the limits of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court noted that Title IV' s relevance 
was only with respect to the appropriate procedures that 
were to be used to decide the case, rather than to 
determine the substance of the decision. 
Title VI of the Act requires nondiscrimination in 
federally assisted programs, thus allowing the participation 
of all in programs subsidized by the federal government. 
The Court has made clear that, like Tide N, Title VI's 
reach is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment's 
reach. Consequently, Title VI only reaches intentional 
discrimination that violates the equal protection clause 
(see Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of 
New York City, 463 U.S 582 (1983]; Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003]). However, federal agencies that 
adininister prograins that provide federal financial assis-
tance are required to issue regulations that effectuate the 
purposes of Title VI. Such regulations under Title VI may 
be as important in a practical sense as Title VI itself. 
Indeed, a recent Title VI case, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275 (2001), arose in the context of a Department of 
Justice regulation that barred the use of rules in programs 
receiving federal assistance from the department that had 
the effect of discriminating based on race. The Court did 
not decide whether the regulation was valid under Title 
VI, but did rule that the regulation did not create a private 
cause of action that would have allowed a private plaintiff 
to recover if an entity was found to be using a prohibited 
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rule that harmed the plaintiffs ability to enjoy the benefits 
of the federally-assisted program at issue. 
Title VII and Equal Employment Title VII, the longest 
section of the 1964 Act by far, requires equal employment 
opportunity. It broadly restricts employers, employment 
agencies, and labor organizations from discriminating with 
respect to employment or employment opportunities based 
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In addition, 
covered entities may not retaliate against employees for 
informally challenging or participating in the official 
challenging of unlawful employment practices. Title VII 
also limits how covered entities can advertise jobs. 
Like all other 1964 Act titles, Title VII merely 
eliminates discrimination on the basis of various character-
istics. Nonetheless, much of the debate regarding the 
proposed Title VII focused on whether its strong anti-
discrimination language effectively created a climate in 
which employers would be required to favor minority 
workers over white workers or risk violating the statute. 
The act's supporters argued that Title VII' s nondiscrimi-
nation language required that workers be treated equally 
without regard to race and could not fairly be read to create 
a preference for any particular group of workers. The Court 
balanced the need for equality and the reality of historical 
discrimination when it allowed a voluntary affirmative 
action plan initiated under Title VII to stand in United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to enforce Title VII. The EEOC was 
given broad powers to investigate and resolve charges made 
by employees against employers, etnployment agencies, 
and labor organizations, but was not given the power to 
adjudicate claims. The charge process was designed to work 
in conjunction with state and local fair employment 
practices commissions whenever possible. When a charge is 
unable to be resolved informally, either the aggrieved 
employee or, in some cases, the EEOC may file suit. 
Title VII is the only title under the 1964 Act that 
barred sex discrimination at its passage, though other titles 
have been amended since 1964 to ban sex discrimination. 
Congressman Howard Smith (1883-1976) of Virginia 
proposed amending the bill late in the legislative process 
to include sex discrimination under Title VII. Smith 
claimed that given the other parts of the act, adding sex 
discrimination to Title VII could not hurt the quality of 
the act. Conventional wisdom suggests that Smith added 
sex discrimination merely to poison the chances that the 
act would pass. Indeed, for that reason, some of the act's 
staunchest supporters opposed Smith's amendment. 
However, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths (1912-) of 
Michigan suggested that she would have proposed adding 
sex discrimination to Title VII had Congressman Smith 
failed to do so. Regardless of how sex entered the bill, it 
did so late in the process and without nearly as much 
discussion as other provisions. The lack of legislative 
history surrounding sex discrimination has provided the 
Court a freer hand in interpreting sex discrimination than 
in interpreting other types of discrimination covered by 
Title VII. 
Title VII has spawned a number of cases that have 
significantly altered the workplace. For example, Duke 
Power Company v. Griggs, 401U.S.424 (1971) sanctioned 
the disparate impact cause of action that does not require 
proof of intentional discrimination. Rather, disparate 
impact can be proven when an employer, lacking a business 
necessity for doing so, employs a facially neutral rule that 
has the effect of discriminating against a certain group of 
workers on the basis of their race, sex, or other characteristic. 
Eventually, this interpretation of Title VII was explicitly 
written into law in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
As importantly, the Court has recognized and defined 
workplace sexual harassment through its interpretation of 
Title VII. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 
(1986), the Court recognized a cause of action for both 
quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual 
harasstnent. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when actual 
job detriment results from the refusal to acquiesce to 
sexually harassing behavior. Hostile work environment 
harassment occurs whenever sexually harassing conduct 
alters the terms, conditions, or privileges of an employee's 
employment without causing tangible job detriment, In 
addition, the Court ruled in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) that same-sex sexual 
harassment may be actionable, though it noted that Title 
VII was not meant to be a "general civility code" for the 
workplace. In that vein, the Court in Burlington Industries 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) ruled that in some 
circumstances employees had to give the employer an 
opportunity to remedy the harassment before the 
harassment would support an award of damages. 
The Court's interpretation of Title VII has not always 
been consistent with Congressional sentiment. For 
example, the Court's refusal to treat pregnancy discri1ni-
nation as sex discrimiI1ation in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) led to the passage of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which defined sex 
discrimination under Title VII to include pregnancy 
discrimination. Similarly, dissatisfaction with Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) spurred 
Congress to pass significant amendments to Tide VII in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 1991 act amendments 
clarified the standards for disparate impact liability, 
clarified the effect of the presentation of evidence that 
both lawful and unlawful motivations caused an employ-
ment decision, provided for jury trials for certain Tide VlI 
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cases, and allowed the recovery of punitive damages in 
some cases. 
IMPACT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
"fhe 1964 Act inaugurated a sea of change in the United 
States. It demands equality for all in many of the most 
important areas of American life. The Court's ready 
acceptance of the constitutionality of the 1964 Act helped 
make the act acceptable to the large majority of 
Ainericans. Of course, the Court continues to interpret 
the act. Though there may be disagreement regarding 
specific interpretations that the Court mal<es, the 
legitimacy of the act and its goals is not subject to debate. 
SEE ALSO Commerce Clause; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Johnson, Lyndon 
B.; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); 
Kennedy, Robett; Sex Discrimination; Warren Court 
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.~IVIL RIGHTS CASES, 109 U.S. 3 
(1883) 
',n the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), a 
0
ns.olidation of five lower court cases involving the 
clusion of blacks from inns, theaters, and ladies' railroad 
s, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the public 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, which were passed under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and guaranteed to all persons 
the "full and equal" enjoyment of inns, public con-
veyances, and places of public amusement, regardless of 
race or color. In declaring these provisions unconstitu-
tional, the Court established state action doctrine, the rule 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals 
against the government, but not against the "merely 
private" wrongs of individuals. 
The Civil Rights Cases were argued on March 29, 
1883, and decided on October 15, 1883, by a vote of 
eight-to-one, with Justice Joseph P. Bradley writing for 
the Court and Justice John Marshall Harlan in dissent. 
The decision is conventionally viewed as fashioning a 
narrow Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and as 
definitively abandoning blacks to southern home rule. 
Over the years, however, the Court's canonical articula-
tion of state action doctrine has been subject to competing 
interpretations. At stake in this contestation are the limits 
of Congress's power under Section 5, as well as the 
historical understanding of the Court's settlement of 
Reconstruction. 
The majority opinion of Justice Bradley rejected both 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds for the 
public accommodation provisions. Regarding the Thir-
teenth Amendment, he agreed that it conferred freedom 
and prohibited the incidents of slavery. Public accommo-
dation rights) however, were not among the fundamental 
rights that defined the "essential distinction between 
freedom and slavery." The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
which protected black rights to property, contract, 
testifying in court, and physical security, inarked out this 
essential line, and Bradley explicitly approved it. But 
Congress "did not assume under the authority given by 
the Thirteenth Amendment to adjust what may be called 
the social rights of 1nen and races in the community." 
Thus involdng the conventional nineteenth-centu1y 
distinction between "civil rights" and "social rights," 
Bradley declared that it would be "running the slavery 
argument into the ground" to count exclusions fron1 
public accommodations as badges of slavery. 
Bradley also rejected the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
basis for the provisions. The conventional reading is that 
the provisions were invalid under Section 5 because they 
regulated private wrongs, and private wrongs are outside 
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. This reading is 
the basis for the view that state action doctrine left blacks 
exposed to Ku Klux Klan violence and private discrimina-
tion. There is disagreement, however, as to what state 
action doctrine may have meant to the Waite Court and 
whether a state's neglect of its duty to equally enforce the 
law counted as "state action" and was thus grounds for 
federal intervention. Accordingly, some suggest that the 
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